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“The imposition of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds are gov-
ernmental functions . . . . The whole justification for permitting the corpo-
rate executive to be selected by the stockholders is that the executive is an
agent serving the interests of his principal. This justification disappears
when the corporate executive imposes taxes and spends the proceeds for ‘so-
cial’ purposes.”1
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INTRODUCTION
This Article will address the question of whether publicly
traded U.S. corporations owe a duty to their shareholders to
minimize their corporate tax burden through any legal means,
or if instead, strategic behaviors like aggressive tax-motivated
transactions are inconsistent with corporate social responsibil-
ity (“CSR”). I believe the latter holds true, regardless of one’s
view of the corporation. Under the “artificial entity” view, such
behavior undermines the constitutive relationship between the
corporation and the state. Under the “real view,” such behav-
ior runs contrary to the normal obligation of citizens to com-
ply with the law (even absent effective enforcement). And
under the “aggregate view,” such behavior differs from other
more-acceptable forms of shareholder profit-maximization, in
that it weakens the ability of the state to carry out those func-
tions that the corporation is barred from pursuing. To contex-
tualize and exemplify this analysis, I present a case study of
profit-shifting at Caterpillar Inc. (“CAT”).
By “aggressive” or “strategic” tax strategies and behavior, I
mean transactions that are not motivated by a valid business
purpose, even if a corporation dresses them up as such and
believes it might survive potential litigation. Until the early
1990s, most large U.S. corporations did not engage in aggres-
sive strategies designed primarily to reduce their U.S. tax obli-
gations.2 Instead, in my experience—as a tax lawyer in the late
1980s and early 1990s—corporations engaged tax counsel to
advise them on the most tax-efficient structure of a deal that
was motivated by valid business purposes.
2. U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Pro-
fessionals: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 10 (2003) (statement of
Sen. Frank Lautenberg), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate/pdf/108hrg/91043.pdf [hereinafter 2003 Tax Hearings].
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This situation changed in the past twenty-five years. Start-
ing in the late 1980s, accounting firms and other promoters
started selling sophisticated tax shelters to large corporate cli-
ents. These shelters were not motivated by business considera-
tions. They were driven by tax and dressed up to appear as a
valid business deal. The first major litigated case involving
such a shelter was ACM—a partnership between Merrill Lynch
(the promoter), Colgate, and a Dutch bank—designed to cre-
ate an artificial capital loss.3 In the period between 1990 and
2004, such corporate tax shelters designed by outside promot-
ers were adopted by most large U.S. corporations. Ultimately,
hearings before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations in 2003 exposed the scope of the corporate tax
shelter phenomenon.4 This in turn led to changes in the tax
law (including codification of the economic substance doc-
trine), changes in the ways accountants and lawyers are regu-
lated, new disclosure rules, and a series of Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) court victories which seem to have eliminated
corporate tax sheltering for the time being.
The underlying problem persists. The prevailing attitude
among large U.S. corporations currently seems to be that ag-
gressive tax planning that is not motivated by business pur-
poses is justified because of competitiveness considerations—
“everyone does it, especially our foreign competitors”—and
because it enhances shareholder value. Paying taxes is seen a
cost that reduces corporate profits, and this negatively impacts
the value of the shares.
Therefore, in the end, I believe that the only solution is to
change the attitude of major U.S. multinationals back to where
it was at the time of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Back then, a
tax director of a major U.S. multinational would typically re-
ject aggressive tax-motivated transactions as inconsistent with
CSR. I will show that today’s permissive attitude towards tax-
motivated transactions is unsustainable under any view of the
corporation.
3. ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
4. 2003 Tax Hearings, supra note 2, at 1–2.
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I.
THE CATERPILLAR PROFIT-SHIFTING CASE STUDY
To render the subsequent discussion more concrete, Part
I reprints a case study about corporate tax aggressiveness that I
presented in my Senate testimony in the spring of 2014.5
Caterpillar, Inc. is “the world’s leading manufacturer of
construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas
engines, industrial gas turbines and diesel-electric locomo-
tives.”6 It was founded in 1925.7 A major reason for Caterpil-
lar’s success has been its ability to service the equipment that it
sells worldwide. Caterpillar promises to deliver any replace-
ment part anywhere in the world within 24 hours from when a
customer requests it. This puts Caterpillar far ahead of its com-
petitors and generates much of its profit this way.8 While Cat-
erpillar’s profit margin on selling equipment is typically below
5. Although edited for this Article, the text of Part I is my Senate testi-
mony, and its citations mostly mirror the citations included there (vel non),
which involve many sources not available to the Journal staff or the public
(such as files I read in, but was not allowed to remove from, the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations’ offices). See Caterpillar Offshore Tax Strategy:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Home-
land Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 1–6 (2014) (statement of
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School),
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/
hearings/caterpillars-offshore-tax-strategy (scroll down and click the
“Download Testimony” link under the “Reuven S. Avi-Yonah” heading)
[hereinafter Avi-Yonah PSI Testimony].
6. Caterpillar, CATERPILLAR, http://www.caterpillar.com (last visited Oct.
5, 2014).
7. History, CATERPILLAR, http://www.caterpillar.com/en/company/
history.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
8. See also Avi-Yonah PSI Testimony, supra note 5, at 1 n.3 (“‘Caterpillar
Logistics Services, Inc. (Cat Logistics) has leveraged its relationship with par-
ent company Caterpillar Inc. in developing true global supply chain manage-
ment capabilities. Cat Logistics has grown to be the sixth largest North
American based 3PL with $1.1 billion in net revenues in 2003. It has been
attracting significant external business; Caterpillar, Inc. now accounts for ap-
proximately 50% of the Cat Logistics revenues. Plans are to grow external
business at a compound annual growth rate of 26% over the next five years’
(citation omitted). According to an internal CAT email from 2007, machines
can consume profitable replacement parts for up to 20 years, and there was
little or no competition for such parts.”).
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10%, its profit margin on parts is typically over 50%.9 In one
year, 80% of Caterpillar’s profits derived from parts sales.10
Caterpillar’s business model is based on a network of in-
dependent dealers, some of whom have been selling the com-
pany’s products for over sixty years. Currently, there are 178
dealers worldwide—forty-eight outside the U.S.—and they em-
ploy 162,000 people. Caterpillar’s dealer network is tightly
controlled from the U.S., and the company has recently an-
nounced that it will centralize its supervision of the dealer net-
work even more than before.
Before 1999, Caterpillar’s purchased finished-parts busi-
ness was run primarily from Morton, Illinois, where the com-
pany maintains its main parts warehouse.11 Whether a part was
manufactured in the U.S. or overseas, it would be shipped to
Morton, and from Morton, it would be shipped either directly
to a customer or to a dealer.12 Caterpillar owned the parts in
the Morton warehouse. This business model enabled Caterpil-
lar to control the flow of parts and ensure that its promise of
delivering parts to customers within 24 hours would be kept.
In September 1998, PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”),
Caterpillar’s auditor, presented a plan to Caterpillar manage-
ment that was explicitly designed to reduce Caterpillar’s U.S.
effective tax rate. The first recommendation in the PwC plan
was to restructure the parts business.13 Under the pre-1999
structure, any profit that Caterpillar made from selling parts
9. Id. at 2 n.4. (“According to a PwC study from October 1999, Caterpil-
lar’s return on sales on ‘prime,’ or equipment, was 2%, while its return on
purchased finished parts was 21%.”)
10. Caterpillar Offshore Tax Strategy: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th
Cong. 25 (2014) (Majority Staff Rep.) [hereinafter Majority Staff Rep.].
11. In 1999, 83% of Caterpillar’s worldwide parts were exported from the
U.S. Id. at 46.
12. Caterpillar Offshore Tax Strategy: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th
Cong. 3–4 (2014) (statement of John P. Steines, Jr., Professor of Law, New
York University School of Law), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
download/?id=0a8110f0-0a75-4eaf-9f72-531f23100359 [hereinafter Steines
PSI Testimony].
13. Majority Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 2. (“Caterpillar paid over $55 mil-
lion to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) . . . to develop and implement the
Swiss tax strategy, which was designed explicitly to reduce the company’s
taxes.”) (internal citation omitted).
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directly to customers in the U.S. or overseas was taxed by the
U.S. Moreover, any profit that Caterpillar’s foreign subsidiaries
made on selling parts they acquired from Caterpillar to their
customers was also taxed by the U.S. because it was “Subpart F
income” and therefore resulted in a deemed dividend to Cat-
erpillar under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §§ 951–60. About
85% of the total profits were earned directly by Caterpillar,
while the other 15% were Subpart F income.
PwC proposed to set up a Swiss entity, Caterpillar Sarl
(“CSARL”), which would be treated as a corporation for Swiss
tax purposes, but as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes. This
was possible under the newly adopted “check the box” regime
for classifying foreign entities for U.S. tax purposes. The part-
ners in CSARL were two Swiss subsidiaries of Caterpillar.
CSARL would then assume ownership of the parts in the Mor-
ton warehouse. If those parts were intended for the U.S. mar-
ket, CSARL would sell them to Caterpillar at no profit, and
Caterpillar would resell them and report the profits on its U.S.
tax return like it did before 1999. However, if the parts were
intended for customers overseas, CSARL would sell them to
independent dealers, which would resell to the non-U.S. cus-
tomers, with the bulk of the profit going to CSARL.
The purpose of this structure was to avoid paying U.S. tax
on the profits from the sale of parts to non-U.S. customers by
eliminating Caterpillar from the supply chain. CSARL would
purchase the parts directly from suppliers and then sell them
directly to the independent dealers overseas; ownership would
never pass through Caterpillar. Accordingly, Caterpillar would
avoid Subpart F because the subpart does not apply to sales by
CSARL to unrelated parties outside Switzerland unless the
parts are acquired from a related party (i.e., Caterpillar).
Despite this drastic change in tax liability, no elements of
the physical process changed. The parts were still shipped by
the suppliers to Morton, and shipped by Caterpillar from Mor-
ton to the independent dealers, without any involvement by
CSARL.14 Caterpillar still ran the logistics business as it had
14. According to Craig Barley, a senior CAT manager, in the early 2000s
85% of CAT’s worldwide parts inventory was managed from Morton. The
aim, however, was to increase the inventory managed from Morton to 100%.
Majority Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 33 n.163. A February 2012 memo to the
board described the “as is” parts business as worldwide suppliers shipping
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before, except that it now did so as an agent for CSARL—the
owner of the parts destined for foreign markets. CSARL had
no warehouse or inventory management system, and the parts
business remained “U.S. centric.”15 Moreover, there was no
physical distinction at Morton between parts destined for the
U.S. market (and therefore sold to Caterpillar at zero profit)
and parts destined overseas. All the parts were inventoried by
Caterpillar as before, except that a “virtual inventory” was cre-
ated to track (for tax purposes) whether any given part was
owned by Caterpillar or by CSARL at any given moment.16
Moreover, if a part intended for the U.S. or overseas was miss-
ing, Caterpillar would “borrow” the part from CSARL, or vice
versa, and restore it later as new parts came in (of course, with-
out affecting the physical movement of any part).17 Currently,
nearly 70% of the purchased finished parts that Caterpillar
sells overseas come from the U.S., and the parts business con-
tinues to be led and managed from the U.S.18
From 2000 to 2012, this “business restructuring” enabled
Caterpillar to shift over $8 billion from the U.S. to Switzerland
without affecting the actual way in which the parts business was
run.19 In fact, it was important to Caterpillar not to change the
successful business model of its parts and parts-delivery busi-
parts to the “master distribution center” in Morton, from which they were
shipped to distributors both in the U.S. and overseas. The memo discussed
future plans to open more warehouses overseas (e.g., in Dubai) to reduce
the shipping costs of this U.S.-centric structure. Id. at 33 & n.167.
15. Majority Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 2. For example, the entire inven-
tory in the Grimbergen facility in Belgium was controlled from Morton,
about 5,000 of 8,000 employees involved in the parts business were in the
U.S., and 10 of 19 parts warehouses were in North America. Id. CSARL has
approximately 400 employees, Steines PSI Testimony, supra note 12, at 4, which
is less than 1 percent of Caterpillar’s global workforce. Majority Staff Rep.,
supra note 10, at 56.
16. Id. at 58. Physically, the parts were indistinguishable and were kept in
the “same bin.” Id. (quoting Deposition of Robin Beran at 58, Schlicksup v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 2011 WL 4007670 (C.D. Ill. 2011)).
17. Over time, CSARL also acquired parts from Caterpillar facilities in
France and Belgium, which were shipped directly from these facilities to
CSARL’s customers. The French and Belgian suppliers were reimbursed on
a contract-manufacturing basis. So once again, the bulk of the profit was
allocated to CSARL as the “entrepreneur” in this transaction. Majority Staff
Rep., supra note 10, at 51.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Majority Staff Rep, supra note 10 at 16.
8 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:1
ness, and therefore the tax department reimbursed the parts
and parts delivery segments of Caterpillar for any added costs
resulting from the restructuring.20 By doing so, the “accounta-
ble profits” of each segment of the business remained at pre-
restructuring levels, which was crucial to achieving coopera-
tion, since accountable profits formed the basis for setting
compensation levels.21 With regard to staffing, almost no se-
nior Caterpillar personnel who were involved specifically in
the parts business and had decision-making authority moved
to CSARL when it took over as nominal owner of all the parts
in Morton.22
In order to defend Caterpillar’s restructuring from a po-
tential transfer-pricing challenge by the IRS, PwC calculated a
royalty rate of 15% (later reduced to the range of 4–6%) to be
paid by CSARL to Caterpillar to compensate it for any value
inherent in its contribution to CSARL’s parts-related profits.23
The royalty rate was based on a comparability study performed
by PwC.24 The result was to shift 85% of the total parts busi-
ness profit from the U.S. (30.5% effective tax rate on Caterpil-
lar) to Switzerland (4–6% effective tax rate on CSARL).25 The
total tax benefit to Caterpillar from this shift over the period
from 2000 to 2012 was approximately $2.4 billion.26
The IRS never challenged this transaction, perhaps be-
cause they did not have access to all the relevant information
at the time. Would this transaction have passed muster? In my
opinion, the answer is no, because it does not have economic
substance. The economic substance doctrine was a well-estab-
20. Steines PSI Testimony, supra note 12, at 4.
21. See Majority Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 92.
22. See id. at 78 & n.440.
23. Steines PSI Testimony, supra note 12, at 5.
24. See CATERPILLAR FISCAL YEAR 2000 U.S. TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMEN-
TATION REPORT II-27-II-33, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (2001); see also Major-
ity Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 80 & nn.484–85. The fixed royalty rate assumes
that Caterpillar did not transfer any intangibles to CSARL and therefore was
not subject to the “super royalty” rule of IRC § 367(d) and 482 (which would
require an adjustable royalty commensurate with the income attributable to
a transferred intangible unless a cost-sharing agreement was in effect). Ma-
jority Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 5 (discussing lack of a super royalty), 12
(discussing effect of IRC § 367(d)).
25. Majority Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 80–81 (indicating the income
shift and the effective Swiss tax rate).
26. Id. at 41.
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lished part of tax law long before it was codified as IRC
§ 7701(o) in 2010. The courts determined that in order for a
transaction to be respected for tax purposes, it must satisfy ei-
ther or both prongs of the economic substance test, which are:
(a) the subjective prong, i.e., that the taxpayer or its agents
believe that the transaction has a valid non-tax business pur-
pose, and (b) the objective prong, i.e., that the transaction has
a reasonable possibility of generating a profit regardless of the
tax consequences. Under the doctrine’s codified version, a
transaction must satisfy both prongs.
The IRS could argue that the Caterpillar restructuring
fails to meet either prong. On the subjective prong, the PwC
documentation from 1998 onward makes clear that the main
purpose of the restructuring was to reduce Caterpillar’s effec-
tive tax rate by removing the parent company from the parts
supply chain, thereby avoiding Subpart F deemed dividends
and achieving deferral for CSARL’s profits.27 Moreover, a se-
nior Caterpillar executive was asked under oath whether
“there [was] any business advantage to CAT to have this ar-
rangement put in place other than the avoidance or deferral
of income taxation at a higher rate,” and he answered in the
negative.28
On the objective prong, while CSARL’s parts business is
very profitable, it is hard to see what the non-tax reason could
be for changing the structure from sales by Caterpillar to sales
by CSARL. The entire restructuring was done so as not to
change the business model of the parts business. No signifi-
cant employees were moved to CSARL, the parts continued to
be shipped to and from Morton by Caterpillar, and the physi-
cal parts were indistinguishable. Moreover, although the ac-
tual inventory remained in Caterpillar, steps were taken to sep-
arate the ownership for tax purposes under the “virtual inven-
tory.” Even after factoring in that overtime, CSARL assumed
ownership of more parts that were not shipped through the
U.S., but it is still hard to see what was and is the business
27. Majority Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 43; see also, e.g., CATERPILLAR INC.,
GLOBAL TAX OPTIMIZATION CASE FOR ACTION, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
(1998); CATERPILLAR INC., GLOBAL TAX OPTIMIZATION RISK ADJUSTED BENEFIT
ANALYSIS, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (1998); DELIVERING VISION 2020, CAT-
ERPILLAR (2009) (explaining the tax advantage of the restructuring).
28. See Majority Staff Rep., supra note 10, at 72 (citation omitted).
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purpose of CSARL nominally owning the parts shipped via
Morton, including the parts it sells at cost to Caterpillar.
Caterpillar’s ex post changes do little to strengthen an ar-
gument that the restructuring had economic substance. Ten
years after the restructuring, Caterpillar tried to bolster
CSARL against a potential IRS challenge by moving some em-
ployees (including a “Worldwide Parts Manager”) to Geneva to
“provide[ ] further [entrepreneurial] substance to preserve
annual parts benefit of $300m.”29 The delay and small scope of
these late efforts, coming ten years after the restructuring,
only reinforce the sense that the original transaction lacked
economic substance, especially since the parts business contin-
ued to be managed from the U.S.30
Caterpillar could attempt to rebut an IRS challenge by re-
lying on the United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner,
an 11th Circuit decision from 2001.31 In UPS, the taxpayer
transferred its lucrative package insurance business to an unre-
lated insurer, which then reinsured it with the taxpayer’s affili-
ate in Bermuda. The net result was to shift the profits of the
business—which were very high, since UPS almost never loses
packages—from the U.S. to Bermuda. The Court of Appeals
acceptance of the taxpayer’s argument that the underlying
business was profitable satisfied the objective prong, without
regard to whether the transfer was motivated by anything
other than tax considerations. But UPS is distinguishable both
because of the intervening unrelated insurer and because
there was nothing left in the U.S. Those two facts stand in con-
trast with the Caterpillar restructuring, where CSARL re-
mained heavily involved in the U.S., and the Caterpillar and
CSARL parts businesses were completely intermingled after
the transaction.
In addition, it is far from clear whether UPS remains good
law. There have been many economic substance cases since
then which took a broader view of the doctrine. In particular,
recent cases indicate that a taxpayer cannot imbue a tax-driven
29. Id. at 77–78. See also id. at 39.
30. Steines PSI Testimony, supra note 12, at 5 (“[M]uch of the purchasing
and logistical functions relating to outbound PFRP continued after the re-
structuring to be carried out by Caterpillar personnel located in the United
States.”).
31. 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
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transaction with economic substance merely by using profita-
ble investments as part of it, because the key question is
whether these profits would have been earned without the
transaction.32 This clearly would have occurred in Caterpillar’s
case.
Thus, in my opinion, the IRS would have had a strong
case to challenge Caterpillar’s original restructuring on eco-
nomic substance grounds. However, the IRS did not do so,
and the relevant tax years are now closed and protected from
further audit. Thus, Caterpillar succeeded in its tax strategy.
The question thus becomes: should Caterpillar have done this
in the first place? Put differently, does the tax strategy’s ex post
success justify its ex ante implementation? No, and to see why,
we need to address the knotty problem of corporate taxation
and CSR.
II.
TAXATION AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Should Corporations Pay Tax? The usual understanding of
this question relates to the debate on whether there should be
a corporate tax. Many observers have recently criticized the
corporate tax and some have defended it, but that is not the
focus of this article.33 Instead, I will assume that the state wants
to tax corporations, for whatever reason (a safe assumption, at
least in the short- to medium-run). Given this assumption, I
will address whether corporations should cooperate and pay
the corporate tax or, instead, engage in “strategic” tax behav-
ior designed to minimize or eliminate their corporate tax bur-
dens.
The answer to this question is related to the voluminous
debate around CSR.34 From the perspective of the corpora-
32. E.g., Salem Fin. Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543 (2013); Bank of
N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15 (2013).
33. For my view on this debate, as well as a review of the extensive litera-
ture, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004).
34. For a review of this debate, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Trans-
formations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005). For previous literature, see, e.g.,
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002); see also Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
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tion, if engaging in CSR is a legitimate corporate function,
then corporations can also be expected to pay taxes to bolster
society as part of their assumption of CSR. If, on the other
hand, CSR is illegitimate, there is a question whether corpora-
tions should try to minimize their tax payments as part of
avoiding CSR and maximizing the profits of their sharehold-
ers.
The answer to the question of whether corporations
should try to minimize their tax payments by any legally per-
missible means thus depends on our view of CSR. That view, in
turn, depends on our view of the corporation. Historically,
three views of the corporation have emerged and rotated in
cyclical fashion. The first is the view that the corporation is
primarily a creature of the state (the “artificial entity” view).
The second is that the corporation is an entity separate from
both the state and its shareholders (the “real entity” view). The
third is that the corporation is merely an aggregate of its indi-
vidual members or shareholders (the “aggregate” or “nexus-of-
contracts” view).35 Each of these three views has different im-
plications for the issue of tax and CSR.
Under the artificial entity view, the corporation owes its
existence to the state and is granted certain privileges in order
to be able to fulfill functions that the state would like to
achieve.36 Thus, engaging in some forms of CSR is part of the
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). For different perspectives on
CSR in general, see, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992); Ronald Chen & Jon
Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Cor-
porate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the
Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (1994); C.A.
Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retro-
spective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002); Cynthia A.
Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002).
35. There has also been considerable philosophical debate on the corpo-
ration as a moral person. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTEN-
TION (Ernest Sosa et al. eds., 1999); MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT:
HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD (2014); Peter French, The Corporation as a
Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979); Christian List & Philip Pettit, Group
Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, 122 ETHICS
608 (2012).
36. See generally supra note 35.
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corporation’s mission, and paying corporate tax is one way of
fulfilling the corporation’s CSR obligations.
Under the real entity view, the corporation is similar to an
individual citizen in its rights and obligations. Just like an indi-
vidual citizen does not have a legal requirement to aid her fel-
low citizens but is praised if she does so, the corporation may
not be required to engage in CSR, but corporate management
should be encouraged if they do so. As for taxes, just like an
individual citizen, a corporation is legally required to pay taxes
and is expected to not engage in over-aggressive tax planning
in an attempt to minimize its tax obligations.37
The most interesting debate is under the aggregate or
nexus-of-contracts view of the corporation, which is the domi-
nant view among contemporary corporate scholars.38 Under
this view, CSR would be an illegitimate attempt by managers to
tax shareholders without their consent, and lead to managers
being unaccountable to the shareholders that elected them. If
so, management arguably has a responsibility to maximize
shareholder profits by minimizing corporate taxes as much as
possible.
This view, when taken to extremes, is misguided. If corpo-
rations are not permitted to engage in CSR, then all social re-
sponsibility functions devolve onto the state. Both taxing and
spending become, to use Milton Friedman’s language, purely
governmental functions. But if corporate managers are re-
37. See generally supra note 35.
38. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency,
21 PUB. POLICY 303, 303–07 (1973); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Corporation in a
Democratic Society: In Whose Interest Ought It and Will It Be Run?, in MANAGE-
MENT IN THE CORPORATION: 1985 99 (Melvin Anshen & George L. Bach eds.,
1960); Friedman, supra note 1. The classic case affirming this “shareholder
primacy” doctrine is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
The shareholder primacy doctrine has become a mainstay of modern corpo-
rate law. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History
for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441, 449–51 (2001) (shareholder primacy
likely to dominate future development of corporate law); FRANK H. EASTER-
BROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
12 (1991) (stating that shareholders, as residual claimants, have implicitly
contracted for promise that firm will maximize profits in long run); HENRY
G. MANNE & HENRY C. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY (1972) (noting that social responsibility of corporations is
shareholder wealth maximizing); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996) (arguing that
principal goal of corporate law is to maximize shareholder wealth).
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quired to minimize tax payments as much as possible, that
could mean that the state is left without adequate resources to
fulfill its governmental function. Thus, the aggregate view of
the corporation, taken to its logical extreme, is self-defeating,
because it could mean that neither corporations nor the gov-
ernment can fulfill their responsibilities to society. That is not
an acceptable outcome.
III.
THE THREE VIEWS OF THE CORPORATION:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, the corporation evolved from its origins in
Roman law in a series of four major transformations. First, the
concept of the corporation as a separate legal person from its
owners or members developed; this was only completed with
the work of the civil law commentators in the fourteenth cen-
tury. By the end of the Middle Ages, the membership corpora-
tion—i.e., a corporation with several members who chose
others to succeed them, legal personality (the capacity to own
property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal responsibil-
ity), and unlimited life—was well established in both civil and
common law jurisdictions. The next important step was the
shift from nonprofit membership corporations to for-profit
business corporations, which took place in England and the
U.S. in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The third
transformation was the shift from closely-held corporations to
corporations whose shares are widely held and publicly traded,
as well as the rise of limited liability and freedom to incorpo-
rate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century
and the beginning of the twentieth. Finally, the last major
transformation was from corporations doing business in one
country to multinational enterprises whose operations span
the globe. That began after World War II and is still going on
today.
Each of these four transformations (as well as a smaller,
more temporary one which occurred in the U.S. in the 1980s
with the advent of hostile takeovers) was accompanied by
changes in the legal conception of the corporation. What is
remarkable, however, is that throughout all of these changes
spanning two millennia, the same three theories of the corpo-
ration can be discerned. Recall that those theories are the ag-
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gregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of
its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which
views the corporation as a creature of the state; and the real
entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum
of its owners nor an extension of the state, but as a separate
entity controlled by its managers.39
Each of these theories has different implications for the
legitimacy of CSR, as indicated in the following table:
TABLE 1: THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION AND CSR
Theory Aggregate Artificial Real
Type For long-run benefit of shareholders Yes Yes Yes
of Not for shareholders No Yes Yes
CSR Not for shareholders, corporations No No Yes
not responsible
The first type of CSR involves activities that can clearly
and demonstrably benefit shareholders in the long run. For
example, actions that prevent environmental disasters or com-
ply with legal and ethical rules can have a significant positive
effect in preventing disastrous corporate calamities, even if
they are costly in the short run. Thus, even proponents of the
aggregate theory—the currently dominant theory of the cor-
poration in academic circles—would support this type of CSR.
The second type of CSR involves activities that are de-
signed to mitigate social harms the corporation was responsi-
ble for, even when there is no direct legal responsibility and
no demonstrable benefit to the shareholders. Under the ag-
gregate theory, such activities should not be permitted be-
cause they do not benefit shareholders. But the artificial entity
theory, since it emphasizes the benefits of corporate existence
derived from the state, infers an implicit contract that the cor-
poration will help the state in mitigating harms that it causes,
even in the absence of legal responsibility. Otherwise, the state
will have to bear this burden imposed by the corporation it
created.
Finally, the third type of CSR involves activities like AIDS
prevention, for which the corporation is not responsible and
which in most cases do not directly benefit (most of) its share-
39. These three theories are the standard ones in the literature. For a full
exposition of these developments, see Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations,
supra note 34, at 771.
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holders, even in the long run. This type of CSR would not be
permitted under the aggregate or artificial entity theories. But
under the real entity theory, since the corporation is regarded
as a person, it is permitted to act philanthropically just like
individuals would, and should in fact be praised to the extent
it does so.40 Thus, under the real theory, even CSR activities
that have nothing to do with benefiting shareholders or direct
corporate responsibility are permitted.
The aggregate or nexus-of-contracts theory has been dom-
inant in U.S. academic circles in recent years,41 but less so else-
where.42 A comparative perspective explains why. Political
economists distinguish among three types of advanced capital-
ist societies. Under the “varieties of capitalism” framework,
economies can be differentiated by their comparative institu-
tional advantages.43 In general, economies can be character-
ized as liberal (market economies, such as the U.S. and the
U.K.), corporatist (organized market economies that rely on
tightly integrated private and networked associations to resolve
significant dilemmas of economic integration, such as Ger-
many and Japan), or statist (economies that depend on hierar-
chical solutions in resolving coordination problems, such as
France).44
The “varieties of capitalism” framework suggests that firms
in each of the three models of economic governance will dis-
tinguish themselves in different fields. In liberal market econo-
mies, the advantages of a flexible regulatory structure benefit
industries targeting low costs and those operating in sectors
characterized by radical innovation (e.g., software, biotechnol-
ogy).45 In corporatist economies, high business coordination
benefits those sectors that rely on long-term contracts, and
firms tend to specialize in high-quality, scale-intensive, and
specialized supplier industries (e.g., autos, machine tools,
40. JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION (1999).
41. Avi-Yonah, Cyclical Transformations, supra note 34, at 817.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 816.
44. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COM-
PARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
45. Orfeo Fioretos, Varieties of Capitalism, Institutional Change, and Multi-
lateralism in Post-War Europe at 11–12 (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
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chemicals).46 Statist economies favor large scale-intensive in-
dustries that have long time horizons or require major capital
investment (e.g., autos, transport).47
There is an obvious correlation between the three vari-
eties of capitalism described by political economists and the
three historical theories of the firm outlined above. The lib-
eral model of the U.K. and the U.S., with its emphasis on
arm’s-length relationships and public trading, best fits the ag-
gregate theory of the firm. The statist and hierarchical model
of France, with its emphasis on the relationship between the
firm and the state, best fits the artificial entity model. And the
German and Japanese style corporatist model best fits the real
entity theory.
This relationship can also explain why CSR is much less
controversial in Europe than in the U.S. Practically every Euro-
pean Union government (including even the U.K.) has pro-
grams designed to foster CSR.48 These programs are hard to
imagine in the U.S., given the widespread hostility to CSR
here.
IV.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE VIEWS FOR CSR AND THE
CORPORATE TAX
What are the implications of the three views of the corpo-
ration summarized above for the question with which we be-
gan, i.e., whether corporations should pay the corporate tax
(assuming that a corporate tax is imposed)?
This is not just a theoretical question, because in fact cor-
porations have significant leeway about whether they should
pay the tax imposed on them. In the U.S., revenues from the
corporate income tax amounted to about a quarter of all fed-
eral tax revenues in 1965; today the tax accounts for less than
10% and shrinking.49 A major reason for this decline is the
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id. at 11–12.
48. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: NATIONAL
PUBLIC POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004).
49. Corporate tax rates were higher before 1986, but the base was nar-
rower, so that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (which reduced the rate from
46% to the current 35%) actually raised taxes on corporations. However, the
effective tax rates today are close to what they were before 1986. See George
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growth of a corporate tax shelter industry, where some of
America’s best minds scour the Internal Revenue Code for
ways to reduce corporate tax liabilities by various transactions
and then sell these transactions to corporate clients for high
fees.50 Estimates of the revenue loss vary, but there is a consen-
sus that it is significant.51
There are two reasons why the decline in corporate tax
revenues is even more pronounced world-wide, especially
among developing countries that have traditionally relied on
the corporate tax for a much higher percentage of total reve-
nues than OECD member countries.52 The first reason is an
K. Yin, Getting Serious about Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History,
54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001); George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do Large Public
Corporations Pay?: Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1793 (2003).
50. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83
TAX NOTES 1775 (1999); David A. Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an
Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73 (2001); George K. Yin, Getting Serious
about Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001).
51. Most estimates of the revenue loss from tax shelters are around $10
billion each year. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-171,
TAX SHELTERS: SERVICES PROVIDED BY EXTERNAL AUDITORS 6–8 (2005); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-104T, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:
CHALLENGES REMAIN IN COMBATING ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS 10–11 (2003)
(statement of Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues); DEP’T OF THE TREA-
SURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS &
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 31 (1999); Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit
Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters: Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame,
and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 231 (Winter 2004); Mihir A. Desai, The
Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income, in 17 TAX POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 169–208 (James Poterba ed., 2003); Joel Friedman, The Decline of
Corporate Income Tax Revenues, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct.
24, 2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-16-03tax.pdf; David A.
Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 243–44 (Winter
2002).
52. In developing countries the corporate tax paid can amount to as
much as 25% of total tax revenues. See WORLD BANK, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK
165 (Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995). There, the average corporate tax from
1990 to 2001 was 17%, as opposed to 7% in developed countries. Michael
Keen & Alejandro Simone, Is Tax Competition Harming Developing Countries
More Than Developed?, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 1317, 1324 (2004). Keen and Si-
mone show that from 1990 to 2001 corporate tax rates have declined in both
developed and developing countries. Id. However, while in developed coun-
tries this decline in the rates was matched by a broadening of the tax base, so
that no decline in revenues can be observed, in developing countries the
same period witnessed a decline of corporate tax revenues by about 20% on
average.
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increase in aggressive tax behavior among corporations, espe-
cially in developing countries that lack the resources to effec-
tively counter strategic tax-planning behavior, such as abusive
transfer pricing. The second is tax competition among coun-
tries to attract corporate investments, which has grown signifi-
cantly in the last two decades.53 This competition enables com-
panies like Intel to pay no tax at all on its non-U.S. income.
The most recent manifestation of this trend has been inver-
sion transactions, in which U.S.-based corporations nominally
move their headquarters to a tax haven like Bermuda. This
can result in a dramatic decrease in worldwide effective tax
rates for the inverting corporation.54 It nominally becomes a
subsidiary of a foreign parent (typically in Bermuda) with no
substantive change in their business (the headquarters stayed
in the U.S.), stripping profits out of the U.S., reducing the
U.S. effective tax rate, and raising share values.
In what follows, I will discuss the implications of each of
the three views of the corporation for the attitude that the cor-
poration should take to paying the corporate tax.
A. The Artificial Entity View
For the artificial entity view, the corporation is a creature
of the state. The state creates it and bestows various legal ad-
vantages on it, such as legal personality and limited liability.
The state also creates the conditions for the corporation to
operate in the market by providing defense and a property
rights regime, as well as building infrastructure and educating
workers.
The implication of this view for CSR, as noted above, is
that the corporation is obligated not to impose additional bur-
dens on the state that created it. Thus, to the extent that the
corporation’s own activities result in additional burdens (e.g.,
by creating pollution), the corporation is obligated to remedy
that situation.
53. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000); Julie Roin, Competi-
tion and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO.
L.J. 543 (2001).
54. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transac-
tions, 95 TAX NOTES 1793, 1794 (2002).
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Whether the artificial entity view requires or permits cor-
porations to engage in CSR that is unrelated to their activities
is less clear. While historically the state created corporations
“imbued with a public purpose,”55 developments since the
mid-nineteenth century (such as general incorporation and
the decline of ultra vires) have led to the view that the corpora-
tion fulfills its purpose sufficiently in engaging in its normal
for-profit activities, and should not be required to do more.
However, that limitation also has implications for the cor-
porate tax. To the extent that the corporation is free to pursue
purely for-profit activities, as long as those do not impose a
burden on the state, the state is left with the obligation to carry
the weight of social responsibility on its own. For example, if
there is a health crisis that the corporation did not contribute
to creating, such as AIDS, then the state, and not the corpora-
tion, has the obligation to address it. But this means that the
state needs resources, and a major way of obtaining these re-
sources is to impose taxes, including the corporate tax.
I would therefore argue that under the artificial entity
view, corporations have an affirmative obligation not to en-
gage in aggressive tax planning designed to reduce their tax
burden. The state created the corporation and the conditions
for its operation in the market. In return, the state may legiti-
mately expect corporations not to impose additional burdens
on it. But since the state and not the corporation bears the
burden of most social obligations under this model, the state
can also expect the corporation to contribute its fair share to
the ability of the state to fulfill its obligations to its citizens.
This means that when the corporation engages in aggressive
tax planning such as corporate tax shelters or abusive transfer
pricing, it is breaching an implicit bargain with the state that
created it, gave it legal rights, and created the conditions for it
to make those same profits it is attempting to shield from tax.
Of course, this begs the question of how to distinguish
abusive tax evasion from legitimate tax avoidance. While this is
a hard question to answer from the government’s perspective,
or in a court of law, it is clearer from the corporation’s per-
spective. Most corporate tax managers know very well when a
55. See William J. Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern
Business Regulation, in THE CORPORATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Naomi
Lamoreaux & William Novak eds., forthcoming 2015).
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transaction is tax- or business-motivated. Thus, it is legitimate
to expect a corporation to police its own behavior in this re-
gard, without worrying too much about where the line should
be drawn.56
B. The Real Entity View
Under the real entity view, the corporation is similar to an
individual. It is an entity made up of people (corporate man-
agers and employees) and is separate from both the state and
from its shareholders.57 The implication for CSR is that our
view of CSR activities that are unrelated to the corporation,
but which are beneficial to society at large, should be the same
as our view of such behavior by individuals: it should not be
legally required, but is praiseworthy and should be en-
couraged when it happens. This is the view most management
takes of CSR, and judging by their advertising, the view of the
general public as well.
What are the implications of the real view for corporate
strategic tax behavior? Judge Learned Hand famously stated in
1935 that there is “not even a patriotic duty”58 for citizens to
pay their taxes; instead, it is the state’s obligation to force
them to do so. But even if that statement could be taken liter-
56. The exception would be tax competition, which arguably represents
legitimate business planning from the corporation’s perspective.
57. As one sociologist has stated, “[t]he recurrent problem in sociology is
to conceive of corporate organization, and to study it, in ways that do not
anthropomorphize it and do not reduce it to the behavior of individuals or
of human aggregates.” Guy E. Swanson, The Tasks of Sociology, in 192 SCIENCE
665–67 (1976). A whole branch of economic sociology centers on the study
of organizations, and there are numerous books devoted to the topic. See,
e.g., JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE BASES
OF ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY (Transaction Publishers, 5th ed. 2003); W. RICH-
ARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS (Pren-
tice Hall, 5th ed. 2002); JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTER-
NAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE
(Stanford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2003); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANI-
ZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg
eds., 1994). Most of these books revolve around the study of large corpora-
tions, since these are the dominant forms of organization in this society.
58. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), (“Any one may
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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ally in 1935 (and there are grounds to doubt that Judge Hand
meant it that way), it certainly cannot be applied in the post-
World War II environment, in which the obligation to pay the
income tax was shifted from the rich to the middle class.59
While much of the success of the U.S. in collecting the income
tax stems from its sophisticated use of withholding and infor-
mation reporting, it is by no means true that nobody pays taxes
voluntarily. If that were the case, the estimates for compliance
in the absence of withholding or information reporting would
be far below 70%. The U.S. tax system could not work unless
the majority of its citizens were trying to abide by the law, not
evade it.
The importance of voluntary compliance can also be
demonstrated by the contrast between the U.S. and countries
in which there is no tax-paying “culture.” The U.S. is far more
successful in collecting the taxes due than countries like Italy
or most developing countries, where the citizens indeed follow
Judge Hand’s dictum (or even regard it as their patriotic duty
not to pay taxes).60 The reason for the relative success of the
U.S., even in an era of sharp cutbacks in IRS audit and en-
forcement activity, is that most U.S. citizens do regard it as
their duty to try to comply with the tax law. That is also the
reason why the U.S. can depend on most residents filing a tax
return and self-assessing their tax liability every April 15th,
even though the refunds they typically get are without interest
and means that they have been giving the government interest-
free loans.
59. Judge Hand’s statement was dicta in the context of the most famous
case shutting down an avenue of tax avoidance, Gregory. As Assaf Likhovski
has shown, this statement (and the whole opinion) should be understood
against the background of the contemporary hearings into tax evasion by
rich and famous Americans such as Andrew Mellon. It seems that if pressed,
even Judge Hand would acknowledge that the tax system could not work if
everybody tried as hard as Mellon did to avoid paying taxes. Assaf Likhovski,
The Story of Gregory: How Are Tax Avoidance Cases Decided, in BUSINESS TAX STO-
RIES 89 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005)
60. Mark D. Phillips, Individual Income Tax Compliance and Information Re-
porting: What Do the U.S. Data Show?, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 531 (2014). See generally
Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of Income
Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine, Comparative Tax Law and Culture, in 11 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 725 (2010).
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In general, the modern literature on tax enforcement as-
sumes that there exists an “enforcement pyramid.”61 At the
bottom are the majority of citizens whose inclination is to try
to comply with the tax law. As you go up the pyramid, the ap-
petite for avoidance increases and the number of citizens de-
creases, and the type of enforcement changes from coopera-
tion and the provision of information to increasingly harsher
enforcement measures. Where the pyramid is reversed and
most citizens do not cooperate, enforcement fails. In that way,
tax law is no different than other laws: a modern state cannot
exist unless most citizens could be expected to comply with the
law most of the time.
From that perspective, if the real view of the corporation
is the correct one, the implication is that the corporation
should behave like an ordinary citizen. The corporation
should try to comply with the tax law to the best of its ability.
Thus, it is legitimate for corporations to try to minimize taxes
paid on ordinary business transactions, but it is not legitimate
to deliberately engage in strategic tax behavior designed solely
to minimize its taxes. As stated above, while this line is difficult
for the government or a court to draw from the outside, it is
not so hard to discern from the perspective of the corporation.
Strangely (at least from today’s perspective), most corpo-
rations held this attitude towards tax compliance before the
1990s. In my experience, the tax function was not viewed as a
profit center, and while corporations tried to minimize tax
costs, large publicly held corporations did not engage in tax
shelters, and were in fact quite conservative in tax matters. It
was part of the corporation’s general responsibility to society
to pay its taxes—just like it is part of an individual’s responsi-
bility—and under the real view, CSR is generally legitimate
even if there is no connection between the uses of the funds
and the corporation’s own activities.
This attitude changed by the mid-90s, and today, major
corporations like General Electric or Colgate-Palmolive have
lost important tax shelter cases.62 Presumably, this shift in atti-
tude was accompanied by a shift in the corporation’s view of
itself, as the aggregate view came to dominate the discussion
61. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION
(2003).
62. ACM P’ship, 73 T.C.M. at 2189.
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and shareholder profit maximization became the sole legiti-
mate goal of corporate activity. To this view, which poses the
hardest challenge to CSR, we now turn.
C. The Aggregate View
How does strategic tax behavior appear from the aggre-
gate perspective on the corporation? Under this view, the sole
legitimate function of the corporation is shareholder profit
maximization, and any CSR activity that is not related to long-
term profit maximization is an illegitimate “tax” imposed by
management on the shareholders, without the accompanying
democratic accountability.
It is easy to see how this view can lead to strategic tax be-
havior. If tax is considered a cost like any other cost imposed
on the corporation, it behooves the management to try to min-
imize this cost, or even turn it into a profit. Thus, the goal of
shareholder profit maximization can naturally lead to corpora-
tions trying to minimize taxes and thus enhance earnings per
share.
In the early 1990s, two factors led an increasing number
of corporations to adopt this view. First, management compen-
sation was linked to earnings per share via stock options. Al-
though this led to abuses in some cases (even leading to corpo-
rations like Enron paying additional taxes on fictitious earn-
ings), in most cases the mechanism worked properly, inducing
management to focus exclusively on increasing earnings per
share. Second, consolidation in the accounting field led the
“Big Four” accounting firms to try to move beyond their tradi-
tional audit functions to devising tax strategies to be sold to
individual corporate clients.
Increasing competition among corporations and increas-
ing pressure on top management to deliver higher earnings
per share explains the rest. In my experience, once some firms
adopted aggressive tax strategies and saw their effective global
tax rate plunge and their earnings per share increase, manage-
ment in other firms came under pressure to deliver similar re-
sults. It became commonplace for the CEO and CFO, who
never bothered to look at a lowly cost center like taxes before,
to summon the tax director and require an explanation as to
why their global effective tax rate was several percentage
points higher than the competition. The tax director, who was
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already under pressure from the accounting firms to try out
novel tax strategies, usually succumbed. Thus, a significant
number of conservative firms came to adopt aggressive tax
strategies.63 The rhetoric of shareholder profit maximization
came to provide a convenient cover and rationalization for this
activity.
A good example of the spread of this type of strategic tax
behavior is the saga of inversion transactions. Before 1997,
most corporate managers assumed that shareholders would
not tolerate a publicly traded U.S. corporation reincorporat-
ing in Bermuda, despite the fact that such transactions could
significantly reduce the overall effective tax rate.64 However,
after Tyco inverted in 1997 and its stock price went up, there
was increased pressure on competitors, resulting in about fif-
teen more inversions soon after.65 The inversions were de-
fended in the name of shareholder profit maximization, even
though, as Desai has shown, they may also have made it easier
to fudge corporate accounts and harm shareholders.66 This
wave only stopped after September 11, 2001, when public out-
cry against “unpatriotic” corporations and ensuing changes to
the tax law blocked the phenomenon—at least temporarily.67
In the past three years, however, there has been a new wave of
inversions, with over twenty U.S. firms establishing a new for-
eign parent in jurisdictions with more favorable tax laws like
Ireland, the U.K., or Canada.68 In order to avoid Section 7874,
which was enacted in 2004 to stop the last wave of inversions,
these transactions are structured as mergers with foreign cor-
porations that are at least 20% of the combined entity. How-
63. See Bankman, supra note 50, at 1784.
64. See Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake, supra note 54.
65. Id. at 1793–94.
66. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Earnings Management, Cor-
porate Tax Shelters, and Book-Tax Alignment, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 169, 180 (2009).
67. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake, supra note 54, at 1793–94.
68. See, e.g., Jacob L. Lew, Close the Tax Loophole on Inversions, WASH. POST
(July 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jacob-lew-close-
the-tax-loophole-on-inversions/2014/07/27/2ea50966-141d-11e4-98ee-daea
85133bc9_story.html; Paul Krugman, Corporate Artful Dodgers, Tax Avoidance
du Jour: Inversion, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/07/28/opinion/paul-krugman-tax-avoidance-du-jour-inversion.html?_
r=0; Daniel Shaviro, Understanding and Responding to Corporate Inversions, DAN
SHAVIRO.BLOGSPOT.COM (July 28, 2014), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/
2014/07/understanding-and-responding-to.html.
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ever, the headquarters of the combined firm typically remain
in the U.S. and the business activities of the U.S. firm remain
unaffected, suggesting that the principal motivation of these
“mergers” is tax reduction rather than a business-motivated
combination.
What is wrong with reducing taxes as a way of maximizing
shareholder returns? The basic problem is that, under the ag-
gregate view, most CSR activities are illegitimate. This necessa-
rily means that the responsibilities devolve upon the state,
which is supposed to use its legitimate taxing function to raise
money to fulfill these obligations.69 But if all corporations en-
gage in strategic tax behavior, the state probably will not be
able to raise sufficient money to fulfill its exclusive social re-
sponsibility functions.
An immediate counter-argument is that this scenario is
unrealistic: since in OECD member countries the corporate
tax amounts to less than 10% of total tax revenue, the state can
replace the lost revenue from corporate tax avoidance by rais-
ing other taxes. But even if one sets aside issues of distribution
and fairness (lowering taxes on capital usually means higher
taxes on labor), this answer is inadequate for three reasons.
First, there may be political constraints to raising other taxes—
especially in the U.S. It seems glib to say that politicians could
respond to a decline in the corporate tax by raising individual
tax rates. Second, individual tax rates may already be set so
high that it becomes highly inefficient and potentially counter-
productive to raise them further. If individual rates are set very
high, there will be an impact on both the labor/leisure trade-
off and on individuals’ willingness to pay, on which the system
depends. Finally, in many non-OECD countries, as well as in
some OECD members like Japan, the corporate tax amounts
to a far higher percentage of total revenues.70 It has been
69. In developed countries, the state may delegate some of its social re-
sponsibility to the non-profit sector. But this is no solution, since under the
aggregate view for-profit corporations are prohibited from donating funds to
non-profits as well, unless it can be shown that such contributions enhance
shareholder returns (which is doubtful). Moreover, the non-profit sector is
weak or non-existent in developing countries, where the CSR issue is most
acute.
70. OECD, Revenue Statistics—Comparative Tables, (data extracted on
Oct. 1, 2014, 12:26 PM), http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.
htm#C_CorporateCaptial.
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shown that tax competition, which is itself a form of strategic
tax behavior, has resulted in significant declines in tax reve-
nues in developing countries, which have not been offset by
tax increases elsewhere.71
It can also be argued that strategic tax behavior by corpo-
rations is positive in situations where the government is inef-
fective or corrupt, and therefore the funds can be put to better
use in the private sector. This is precisely the reason that
under the real view, CSR is acceptable, because in many situa-
tions, corporations are better situated than the government to
address social problems. But this argument cannot be made
under the aggregate view, because there, almost all CSR is ille-
gitimate, and solving social problems is the exclusive responsi-
bility of the government.
Thus, it seems there is an internal contradiction in Milton
Friedman’s argument,72 just as the corporate tax shelter wave
of the 1990s demonstrated. If the sole function of corporations
is profit maximization, it seems to follow that corporations
should maximize profits by minimizing their taxes. But if all
corporations avoid paying taxes, the result can be inadequate
revenue for the government to fulfill those obligations for
which, under the aggregate view, it bears the responsibility.
The result would be that neither corporations nor the govern-
ment can address social problems, and I do not think most
would regard that outcome as desirable.
First, U.S. corporations somehow managed to do without
such aggressive tax planning for many decades without imped-
ing either their competitiveness or their market valuation. Sec-
ond, there is no clear evidence that a reduction in the effective
U.S. tax rate translates into higher share values. Stock market
prices are influenced by many factors, and there are plenty of
publicly traded U.S. corporations that derive most of their
profits from the U.S. and pay a high U.S. effective tax rate, but
nevertheless have high stock prices.
I would thus argue that even under the extreme version of
the aggregate view, corporations do have an affirmative obliga-
tion to pay their taxes, so as to enable the state to carry out
those functions that they are barred from pursuing since they
are unrelated to the goal of shareholder profit maximization.
71. Keen & Simone, supra note 52, at 1317.
72. Contra supra text accompanying note 1.
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This, in fact, can be seen as another justification of imposing
tax on the corporation—rather than bear any social responsi-
bility, the corporation can, by paying its taxes, shift that re-
sponsibility to the state, where it belongs.
Thus, strategic tax behavior seems to be inconsistent with
any view of the corporation. Under the artificial entity view, it
undermines the constitutive relationship between the corpora-
tion and the state. Under the real view, it runs contrary to the
normal obligation of citizens to comply with the law even in
the absence of effective enforcement. And under the aggre-
gate view, it is different from other forms of shareholder profit
maximization, in that it weakens the ability of the state to carry
out those functions that the corporation is barred from pursu-
ing. It would thus seem that whatever view management takes
of its relationship to the shareholders, to society, and to the
state, it is never justified in pursuing tax strategies that have as
their only goal minimizing the corporation’s tax payments to
the government.
CONCLUSION: JUST SAY NO
The prevailing attitude among large U.S. corporations
seems to be that aggressive tax planning that is not motivated
by business purposes is justified because of competitiveness
considerations and because it enhances shareholder value.
The argument seems to be that paying taxes is a cost that
reduces corporate profits and this negatively impacts the value
of the shares. At bottom, this traditional defense of reducing
corporate tax in order to benefit shareholders leans hard on
the aggregate view of the corporation.
I have argued that under any of the major views of corpo-
rations, corporations should not be permitted to engage in
strategic behavior designed solely to minimize its taxes. From
an artificial entity perspective, such behavior undermines the
special bond between the state and the corporations it created.
From the real entity perspective, it is as unacceptable as it
would be if all individual citizens engaged in it. Further, from
an aggregate perspective, strategic tax behavior does not leave
the state with adequate revenues to fulfill the increased obliga-
tions imposed on it by forbidding corporations to engage in
CSR.
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There are strong moral arguments against this strategic
tax behavior that I have not covered in depth here. Passing the
buck by shifting the tax burden to others, including taxpaying
shareholders, hardly seems “responsible” in the moralistic
sense. Even if competitors, especially foreign ones, practice re-
ducing taxes as close to zero as possible, popularity does not
justify immoral behavior.
Thus, what are the implications for a case like Caterpillar?
Most U.S. corporations nowadays acknowledge that—in addi-
tion to maximizing profits and value for their shareholders—
they also have a responsibility to other stakeholders such as
their employees and customers, as well as to U.S. society. It is
rare to find a U.S.-based multinational corporation that does
not declare on its website that it is committed to CSR, despite
the critiques launched against CSR in academic circles.
I do not think the various post-2003 changes will prevent a
new wave of corporate tax shelters. The IRS cannot be ex-
pected to overcome a determined effort to reduce taxes by any
means by most large public U.S. corporations. For example,
inversions are already back—the IRS has the power to combat
the type of tax aggressiveness exemplified in the Caterpillar
case, but it failed to do so, perhaps because it was deluged with
even more aggressive shelters, and it did not have access to all
the information that became public at the 2014 Senate hear-
ing. I suspect that there are other cases, too, in which major
corporations were able to engage in tax strategies that they
knew lacked economic substance and were not adequately
challenged by the IRS.
Therefore, in the end, I believe that the only solution is to
change the attitude of major U.S. multinational corporations
back to where it was at the time of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The proper response of a corporate tax director to a proposed
transaction that he or she knows is not motivated by a valid
business purpose—even if it can be dressed up like one and
even if he or she thinks it might possibly prevail in litigation—
is to just say no.
